This paper tries to explain the declining level of public investment in OECD countries by taking account of political and economic driving forces. The theoretical framework hints to the relevance of a number of demand and supply factors -ranging from the yield of public investment to institutions like the EU deficit limits of the Stability and Growth Pact. The econometric results indicate that the decline is largely due to two developments: First to the pile-up of public debt since the 70s which in the 90s severely restricted ability to finance new investment. Second to the increasing mobility of factors that has added to the financing difficulties. In contrast to that neither the privatisation process nor EU deficit restrictions of the Maastricht Treaty or other political factors can explain the decline. H 63, H87 
During the nineties in many OECD countries a marked drop of government investment spending has occurred. Figure 1 depicts public capital formation in relation to GDP for the big four EU countries, USA and Canada. The reasons for this reduction are not very well understood. While for some EU countries the consolidation pressure from the Maastricht criteria might add to the explanation (BALASSONE/FRANCO, 2000) , this explanation does not help in regard to countries for which EMU deficit limits are irrelevant. Furthermore, the decline seems to stand in contradiction to insights from the globalisation debate. The relative shift of public expenditures towards consumption spending is puzzling in times of increasing factor mobility. With companies becoming more footloose, one would expect government budgets to be restructured towards the needs of these mobile factors.
On the revenue side some developments seem to be in line with mobile factors' prefereces. In many countries the fiscal burden is shifted away from corporate taxes towards indirect taxes 1 The pictures are very similar for the share of investment in total government spending.
3 and social security contributions. 2 On the expenditure side, however, the development stands in contrast to globalisation theory. Assuming that mobile agents like multinational firms appreciate public investment spending more than consumption spending one should expect an increase of public investment and not a decline. This should hold in particular for the nineties which were characterised by the abolition of many restrictions to capital flows and a boom of foreign direct investment.
With this background, the paper tries to contribute to a better understanding of the economic and political forces driving public capital formation in industrial countries. At the same time it tries to fill a gap in the empirical literature on the relationship between globalisation and budgetary policy. This empirical literature (surveyed in SCHULZE/ URSPRUNG, 1999, and VAUBEL, 2000) so far has largely ignored investment spending. Only two studies are known to the author, where a relationship between globalisation indicators and public investment is tested "by the way" without paying particular interest to this expenditure variable and to the political-economic processes determining public investment. RODRIK (2000) who is mainly interested in the puzzle of a positive correlation between globalisation indicators and government consumption also includes cross section regressions for investment-GDP-ratios based on a large sample of more than a hundred countries. The analysis is based of data averages for two periods: 1985-1989 and 1990-1992 . RODRIK finds regional dummies, a dummy for socialists in power (negative) and openness (share of trade in GDP, positive) to be the only significant explanatory variables for public investment. GARRETT (1998) These studies leave many questions unresolved. They end in the early nineties and thus cannot account for integration boosts like the completion of the EU internal market. Furthermore, important potential determinants of public investment are missing. Although Garrett suspects that privatisation programmes could be behind the decline of investment he does not test for 2 SCHULZE/URSPRUNG (1999) survey the empirical literature on tax competition. The evidence for some downward competition of corporate taxes is strong in studies based on (effective) tax rates. Revenue based studies come to contradicting remarks. this possibility.
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Furthermore it is questionable whether globalisation indicators like trade-GDP-ratios really measure the developments that are most relevant for public investment.
Proxies for capital costs, the political-economic rate of time preference and liquidity contraints are missing. This paper tries to address these shortcomings by the integration of appropriate variables.
In the following section 2 a framework is presented which allows to identify potential political and economic determinants of public capital formation together with a discussion of available variables. The section 3 presents the econometric analysis based on an OECD country panel.
Section 4 concludes.
Theoretical determinants and available proxies
A basic insight of the political-economic theory on budget optimisation based on probabilistic voting (see for example HETTICH/WINER, 1997) is the following: For any expenditure item an optimising government under political competition will choose the level where marginal vote losses of raising revenues equals marginal vote gains from spending increases.
This basic concept is also helpful to derive a testable relationship for the determinants of public investment. Generally speaking, all developments that increase the marginal political benefits of public capital formation (the demand side) and that reduce the marginal political costs of financing it (the supply side) should increase investment. Table 1 and 2 summarise on that basis possible determinants for public investment and suggests employable indicators.
Demand side:
Among the factors that lead to an increasing appreciation of public investment among voters is its yield for the general economy. However, the relevance of future returns on investment for today's decision is affected by the political discount rate. The larger the discount rate the less interest is paid to the returns on public investment.
If enterprises for which public investment is an input factor are mobile this should also positively influence the political demand for public investment since these expenditure become a variable to attract foreign companies and thus to foster employment and growth.
The same holds in the case of mobile households for which public investment has a direct positive impact on utility.
Furthermore, the ideology of governments concerning the role of the state in the economy and spending priorities can be regarded as a demand factor.
Supply side:
From supply side considerations all factors tend to decrease equilibrium investment that increase the costs of raising revenues. Real interest rates and debt sustainability should matter.
If borrowing costs increase or the debt situation comes close to a debt crisis this negatively affects the power of any government to raise revenues. The same holds for binding institutional limits on deficit financing. Such limits exist in EU countries with the EMU convergence criteria and the subsequent Pact for Stability and Growth. In addition, the following factors should reduce the optimal level of investment from the supply side consideration: A low political discount rate since it leaves deficit financing less attractive and a high mobility of the tax base since this restricts the taxation power of a government.
Note that both the political discount rate and factor mobility thus have an impact on optimum public investment through both the demand and the supply side -with contradicting signs.
Mobility of factors will only positively impact on public investment if the demand effect (public capital formation leaves a location more attractive) outweighs the supply effect (the financing needs drive out the mobile tax base). Similarly, a small discount rate will only foster investment if the demand effect (return on investment has a larger political impact) more than counterbalances the supply effect (the burden of the debt is taken more seriously). Tables 1 and 2 also include in the third column indicators that are used in this study as proxies for each determinant of public investment (for sources see table in appendix):
-The measurement of growth effects of public capital formulation is a demanding task (see Balassone/Franco, 2000 , for a short survey on that literature). Here, a pragmatic way is chosen and some easily available structural variables are used as proxies for the return to public capital formation: population growth -measured by the fertility rate -and per capita income.
-The number of elections or cabinet reshuffles (EOC) in the last three years is used as an indicator of political stability which stands for the political discount rate of a country.
-Political preferences can be measured in terms of political orientation of the government.
The specific variable employed is the share of left parties' seats in the governing coalition (LIG).
-Real interest rates are an obvious specification for borrowing costs. These are calculated ex post, i.e. as the difference between long term government bond yields and the actual inflation rate.
-The debt-GDP-level is a rough but easily accessible sustainability indicator. It has, however the problem, to be solely based on the explicit part of the public debt. In order to take also account of the hidden part, the share of population below the age of 14 is added to the explanatory variables -a low share indicating a large hidden (demographically caused) public debt. Two further groups of variables have to be added to the analysis.
-First cyclical variables in order to control for an impact of the business cycle. Here the gap between potential and actual GDP and the unemployment rate is used.
-Second a proxy for privatisation. In theory, privatisation of publicly owned enterprises should not influence the level of public investment. According to the rules of national accounting these units and their investment are ascribed to the enterprise sector -whether the owner is the state or a private agent. However, in the context of privatisation during the nineties reclassifications e.g. of public utilities from general government to the private sector have occurred (BALASSONE/FRANCO, 2000) . Thus, the measured decline of public investment might partially be a statistical artefact due to privatisation. In order to take care for this possibility, a proxy for public property is used: property income received by the government. A 3-year-moving-average of this time series is calculated in order to limit the cyclical pattern likely to characterise this series.
The table in the appendix informs about all data sources and summarises the specifications employed in the regressions.
The econometric evidence
In the following panel estimations are performed for up to 16 OECD countries.
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Estimations are based on the period 1980-1999. A dynamic specification (the lagged dependent variable is among the explanatory variables) is chosen, estimation technique is OLS with White heteroscedasticity-consistent covariances. There are two specifications of the dependent variable: public investment relative to GDP and relative to total government expendituresthe latter being more meaningful in times of a changing size of the state.
Columns (1) and (3) of Table 3 1980-1998 1980-1999 1980-1998 1980-1999 1980-1999 1980-1999 
Conclusion
From theoretical considerations a whole range of variables could be important for the decision on public investment and therefore be able to explain its decline in recent years. The empirical evidence of this study only supports the importance of two variable groups: the debt and mobility related indicators.
The most robust results concern the level of hidden and open public debt -a high debt level is associated with a low level of public investment. Thus the decline of public investment in the nineties can be regarded as a consequence of fast growing debt mountains between the 70s and the 90s. This results clearly underlines the costs of public debt for future generations: In times of growing debt services it becomes increasingly difficult to mobilise government revenues for new investment projects.
Furthermore, mobility of factors adds to the explanation. Although investment might be a useful instrument to attract mobile factors (demand effect), its financing burden deters mobile factors (supply effect). According to these results, the supply effect dominates the demand effect.
Rodrik's finding about left governments being associated with lower investment levels does not survive in this richer specification. One further result concerns the impact of privatisation:
this does not seem to have played any role in explaining the decline in investment. The control variable was insignificant. This is an uneasy insight: The excuse that the investment decline might be a statistical artefact due to the privatisation process is not valid. In the European context it is interesting to stress that the EMU deficit limits did not in a significant way add to the decline in investment.
